This talk will concern two main metaphysical issues about modality: What is the source of modality? How many kinds of modality are there, and what are the relations between them? In the first, longer part, I focus on what I call “factual modality” – roughly, modality concerning objective matters, including metaphysical, logical, conceptual, mathematical, and natural modality. I briefly present a view on which all these kinds of modality – including natural modality – are grounded in essence, metaphysical modality being the main kind, and the other ones being sub-kinds of it; in particular, natural necessities in the form of causal laws are grounded in dispositional essences. I will provide general motivations for such a view, but I will mostly focus on three major issues and try to address them: (1) This view entails that all natural necessities are metaphysically necessary, but it seems that at least some of them are not; (2) This view entails that certain necessities are grounded in dispositions, but it seems that a mere disposition is unable to ground any necessity; (3) On such a view, what exactly would be the relations between the different kinds of necessity and, in particular, would some of them be stronger than other ones? In addressing these issues, I will, in particular, argue both against Kit Fine’s claim that natural necessity is a sui generis kind of necessity, and against Rani Anjum & Stephen Mumford’s claim that dispositionality is a sui generis form of modality. In the second, shorter part of the talk, I consider a further major kind of modality (perhaps the only remaining one), namely normative modality, and try to see how it can be included in, or how it is related to, the account that I suggest. I argue that, whether normative matters are objective matters or not, normative modality may be understood in essentialist terms as well – which would pave the way for a general essentialist view of modality.