Abstract
The aim of this paper is to discuss the notion of privacy in Plotinus’ *Enneads*. The Plotinian inward turn of the soul influenced Augustine’s thought and in particular the development of his notion of the inner self as a private space. Yet it has been maintained that the Augustinian inward turn requires a double movement of the soul (first in then up) which is not found explicitly in the *Enneads*. I shall argue that Plotinus’ theory of the soul does involve a ‘double movement’. His ‘dual-aspect theory of the self’ is central to his psychology, and the location of the soul’s middle region (*to meson*) between the higher intelligible world and the lower perceptible reality is crucial to his ontology. I suggest that Plotinus’ conception of privacy is to be found in the combination of soul’s self-constitution and its conscious apprehension of being.